Policy and Internet

Does Institutional Setting Affect Legislators' Use of Twitter?

John A. Scherpereel, Jerry Wohlgemuth, and Audrey Lievens

This study investigates whether members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and members of national parliaments (MNPs) use social media in distinctive ways. Specifically, it examines whether institutional differences affect the frequency, quality, and nature of legislators' Twitter communications. Controlling for factors that previous studies find significant, we select for two kinds of legislators: (i) MEPs who are serving in the 2014–19 term and who served as MNPs immediately before their election to the EP and (ii) MEPs who served in the 2009–14 term and have subsequently become MNPs. We compare selected legislators' tweets over a three-month period during their EP tenures with their Twitter behaviors over an analogous period during their NP tenures. The statistical results demonstrate few significant differences between MEPs and MNPs. A preliminary qualitative probe suggests that legislators' tweet patterns may owe less to the institution they serve and more to their policy responsibilities and leadership positions within particular institutions.

KEY WORDS: political communication, representation, European politics, social media, multilevel governance

本文调查了欧洲议会议员（members of the European Parliament，简称MEPs）和国家议会议员（members of national parliaments，简称MNPs）是否在使用社交网络服务上存在不同。 具体而言， 本文检测了制度差异是否会影响立法者在推特交流中的频率、质量和本质。 为控制之前研究发现的显著因素，本文选择了两种立法者进行研究：(a) 任期为2014 - 2019年 的MEPs—他们在被选为欧洲议会议员前刚担任过MNPs； (b) 曾在2009 - 2014年间担任MEPs—之后被选为MNP。 本文在立法者担任欧洲议会议员期间内挑选了其中三个月所发送的推特信息，并将其在担任国家议会议员期间类似时期的推特行为进行对比。 统计结果表明： MEPs和MNPs之间几乎不存在显著差异。一项初步定 性调查暗示： 立法者的推特模式更多地取决于其政策责任和在特定机构中的领导地位，而不是其所服务的机构。

关键词： 政治传播，代表，欧洲政治，社交媒体，多层次治理

Este estudio investiga si los miembros del Parlamento Europeo (MEPs) y los miembros de parlamentos nacionales (MNPs) utilizan las redes sociales de formas distintivas. Específicamente, se examina si las diferencias institucionales afectan la frecuencia, calidad, y naturaleza de las comunicaciones de Twitter de los legisladores. Con control sobre ciertos factores que estudios previos

doi: 10.1002/poi3.156

encuentran significativos, seleccionamos dos tipos de legisladores: (i) MEPs cuyo mandato es de 2014 a 2019 y que han ejercido inmediatamente después de su reelección al Parlamento Europeo y (ii) MEPs cuyo mandato es de 2009 a 2014 que después fueron MNPs. Comparamos los tweets de legisladores selectos en un periodo de tres meses durante su mandato en el Parlamento Europeo a su comportamiento en Twitter en un periodo análogo durante sus mandatos en parlamentos nacionales. Las estadísticas resultantes muestran muy pocas diferencias significativas entre los MEPs y los MNPs. Un sondeo cualitativo preliminar sugiere que los patrones de tweets podrían tener menos que ver con la institución en la que se desempeñan y más que ver con sus responsabilidades políticas y posiciones de liderazgo dentro de instituciones específicas.

PALABRAS CLAVES: comunicación política, representación, política europea, Redes sociales, Gobernanza multinivel

Introduction

More than 10 years after Twitter's establishment, politicians continue to flock to the service. Twitter has attracted politicians across countries and across levels of government. Donald Trump, whose tweets have drawn much attention (Enli, 2017), is the latest in a long line of politicians who have used Twitter to connect with—and occasionally lambaste—mass publics, journalists, and peers (Ausserhoffer & Maireider, 2013; Enli, 2017; Golbeck, Grimes, & Rogers, 2010; Grant, Moon, & Grant, 2010; Jackson & Lilleker, 2011; Larsson & Kalsnes, 2014; Lassen & Brown, 2011; Peterson, 2012; Rauchfleisch & Metag, 2016).

This article seeks to push forward scholarship on "politicians on Twitter" by focusing on the extent to which politicians' institutional settings might affect the ways they use Twitter. We use the fact that politicians integrate the European Union (EU) into multilevel political careers (Stolz, 2003) to generate insights into potential institutional effects on Twitter use. Employing a novel research design that holds individuals constant across institutions, we test the idea that politicians' patterns of Twitter use may vary depending on the institutions they inhabit. This approach—which compares individuals' Twitter behaviors across different "territorial moments" in their political careers—is new. While researchers have examined subnational (Bernhard & Dohle, 2015; Bruns & Highfield, 2013; Cook, 2016; Grant et al., 2010; Highfield, 2013; Larsson & Moe, 2013; Riarh & Roy, 2014), national, and supranational (Larsson, 2015; Obholzer & Daniel, 2016; Scherpereel, Wohlgemuth, & Schmelzinger, 2017) politicians on Twitter, there have been few attempts to isolate the effects of institutional setting on Twitter use. In examining politicians' day-to-day Twitter behaviors and attending to potential differences across territorial levels, we seek to fill two of the three gaps in the "politicians on Twitter" literature that Larsson and Svensson (2014) have recently identified.

We compare Twitter use by members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and members of national parliaments (MNPs). We discuss the ways that

MEPs' and MNPs' divergent structural positions might affect their approaches to Twitter. After deriving alternative hypotheses, we test these hypotheses via a novel research design. Our design holds individuals constant across institutions, isolating individuals who have served as both MEPs and MNPs. Our statistical analyses reveal few significant institutional effects: overall, it seems that the chamber a legislator serves has little effect on her Twitter behavior. A follow-up qualitative probe however, may begin to indicate why some MEPs are nonetheless, more active than they were as MNPs, and vice-versa: the nature of legislative duties and policy responsibilities, we suggest, may do more to condition Twitter behavior than a legislator's institutional context.

The Attractiveness of Twitter

Legislators seek to serve citizens, pursue policy, and promote their careers (Fenno, 1978). They use various communicative channels to accomplish these goals; even the most active Twitter users continue to utilize direct mail, email, websites, party billboards, and other tools. In this section, however, we present reasons why legislators might feel particularly attracted to Twitter. After presenting the rationale for Twitter adoption by "generic" legislators, we focus directly on MEPs and MNPs. Diverse strands of theory suggest alternative hypotheses for these two categories: some suggest that MEPs will be particularly drawn to Twitter, while others suggest the opposite.

Attractiveness of Twitter for a Generic Legislator

With its 140-character limit, Twitter is a restrictive medium that does not lend itself to deep exchanges. The service does, however, offer benefits that can help legislators to accomplish their goals. The first benefit is speed: legislators' tweets reach followers more quickly than other communications. Twitter also offers spontaneity: legislators in democracies are often keen to personalize their appeal, and a skillfully timed, trenchant tweet can give the impression of opinion leadership and/or independence. This benefit is particularly attractive in a context where public support for mediating institutions like political parties (Van Biezen & Poguntke, 2014), religious organizations (Burkimsher, 2014; Voas, 2009), and labor unions (Ebbinghaus, 2002) is declining. Another benefit is interactivity: legislators can use Twitter to signal openness to dialogue. Unlike person-to-person meetings, telephone calls, emails, or (most) Facebook posts, Twitter communications are public and asymmetric. Anyone can follow and/or tweet at a legislator, and the legislator can publicly respond to or retweet other posts. Finally, as Twitter has moved beyond the early adoption era, tweeting is increasingly seen as something that legislators do. The lawmaker who does not tweet risks being seen as out of step.

Attractiveness of Twitter for a Member of the European Parliament

Twitter's benefits—speed, spontaneity, interactivity, currency—may be more attractive to members of some legislatures than others. They would seem, at first glance, to be particularly attractive to MEPs. A leitmotif of EU history has been the EP's accretion of power (Hix & Høyland, 2013; Rittberger, 2005), with direct elections and treaty reforms expanding the parliament's prerogatives. The EP's empowerment has progressed in tandem with the EU's deepening and widening. With 751 members positioned at a critical institutional node, the EP is an essential part of the Brussels bubble. This position does not come without challenges: MEPs must establish positions within policy networks, master a range of rules, and, often, communicate in multiple nonnative languages. While the EP is one of the world's largest and most complex legislatures, MEPs currently influence the lives and livelihoods of over 500 million citizens and countless others beyond the EU's borders.

This strength contrasts with the weakness of MEPs' "electoral connection" (Mayhew, 1974). Even as the power and reach of the EP has expanded, increasing numbers of Europeans have eschewed EP elections. Community-wide turnout has tumbled from 65.9 percent (1979) to 42.5 percent (2014). When asked to discuss EU institutions, EU citizens generally mention the EP before the other institutions (European Commission, 2014). They continue, however, to interpret EP elections as second-order phenomena (Hix & Marsh, 2007; Schmitt, 2005), and they struggle to retain EP-related news (European Commission, 2013).

MEPs continue to suffer from a communications deficit (Anderson & McLeod, 2014). The results of a U.K.-based poll from 2014 are illustrative in this regard: 52 percent of U.K. voters were confident they could name their Westminster MP; 31 percent thought they could name a local councilor; only 11 percent were confident they could name one of their MEPs (Coman & Helm, 2014). Comparing the EP to the U.S. Congress, Hix and Høyland (2013, p. 184) stress the weakness of MEPs' connectivity with citizens: "there remains one glaring difference between the U.S. Congress and the EP: in the former, there is a powerful 'electoral connection' between citizens and elected legislators, whereas in the latter this connection is extremely weak. In fact, it is not a major overstatement to claim that the electoral connection in the EP is almost nonexistent!" As actors with significant power but a weak electoral connection, we might expect MEPs to take full advantage of Twitter's benefits.

The general consensus among those examining the *quality* of politicians' online interactions is that politicians usually use Twitter to provide information (Broersma & Graham, 2012; Bruns & Highfield, 2013; Gibson & Ward, 2009; Golbeck et al., 2010; Grant et al., 2010; Highfield, 2013; Lilliker and Koc-Michalska, 2013; Riarh & Roy, 2014; Vergeer, Hermans, & Sams, 2013). MEPs, though, face an acute communications deficit, and they might well seek to use the service to highlight their relevance, openness, and commitment to democratic public service. They might, for example, use Twitter as a way of informing followers of the work that they (and the EP more broadly) are doing on the

public's behalf. They might also use it to provide personal details that promote recognition and retention and to compensate for their physical distance from citizens by soliciting feedback, responding to trending topics, and weighing in on issues they know matter to followers. These considerations, along with recognition of the EU's multilingualism, multiculturalism, and ability to affect the lives of citizens across a diverse continent support the following hypothesis:

H1: MEPs will tweet more, engage more dialogically with users, and tweet more multilingually than MNPs.

Attractiveness of Twitter for a Member of a National Parliament

Alternative theoretical strands, however, support an opposite hypothesis. The foundation of the latter hypothesis begins with an observation that, like MEPs, MNPs occupy powerful political positions. Fish and Kroenig's (2009) parliamentary power index (PPI) integrates measures of the legislature's influence over the executive, institutional autonomy, specified powers, and institutional capacity, with indices ranging from 0 (least powerful) to 1 (most powerful). While the spread of PPI scores in the 26 EU member states studied by Fish and Kroenig (2009) is wide (0.41 to 0.84),[1] Cyprus (0.41) is the only member state whose PPI falls below the global average (0.49), and only three other EU countries studied (France, Ireland, and Portugal) have PPIs that are less than one standard deviation above the global PPI mean (0.49, SD = 0.2).

MNPs' electoral connections tend to be strong. With regard to tweet frequency and quality, though, there are a number of reasons to expect MNPs to be particularly attracted to Twitter. Research on MNPs (e.g., Bernhard & Dohle, 2015) suggests, for example, that few politicians use Twitter in a "Trumpian" fashion—for example, to undermine or bypass "mainstream media." On the contrary, politicians are keen to capture journalistic attention. While they may be secondarily interested in communicating with mass publics or other politicians, they see Twitter as means of attracting media coverage. The Brussels press corps has expanded over the course of the last three decades, but (i) a disproportionate number of Brussels-based journalists are freelancers; (ii) media outlets generally devote more space to national news than EU news; and (iii) the audience for national news is stronger than the audience for European news. It is reasonable, given these facts, to assume that MNPs might be more attracted to Twitter than MEPs, who inhabit a less institutionalized, less familiar media landscape.

There is also a theoretical reason to expect MNPs to be more willing than MEPs to use Twitter dialogically. While party (group) cohesion tends to be relatively strong in the EP, it has been particularly important in NPs (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2005; Sieberer, 2006). Twitter, which allows a legislator to highlight her distinctiveness from party peers, to express her personality, and to "humanize" herself, may be an especially attractive tool in highly cohesive national political contexts (Jackson & Lilleker, 2011). This fact, in addition to

the facts that national public spheres are more institutionalized than the European public sphere (Machill, Beiler, & Fischer, 2006), that voters in national elections tend to be more familiar with policy issues than voters in European elections (Hobolt, 2007), and that traditions of deliberation are more established in national contexts might incline MNPs to dialogue more on Twitter than MEPs. While there is little theoretical reason to expect MNPs to be more multilingual than MEPs, there is at least some reason to expect them to tweet more and to utilize Twitter's properly "2.0" features. These considerations support the following hypothesis:

H2: MNPs will tweet more and engage more dialogically with users than MEPs.

Study Design, Data, and Method

To determine the extent to which MEPs and MNPs utilize Twitter in distinctive ways, we take advantage of the EU's multilevel nature. While political scientists have made progress in tracking MEPs' careers (Arter, 2015; Borchert & Stolz, 2011; Daniel, 2015; Scarrow, 1997; Stolz, 2003; Whitaker, 2014), the field still lacks a comprehensive longitudinal career database. Recent contributions suggest that national trends vary but that, overall, the degree of movement from one territorial level to another may be decreasing over time (Borchert & Stolz, 2011; Whitaker, 2014).

Interlevel leaps still occur, however, and our empirical strategy isolates individuals who have made such leaps. Following Stolz (2003), we construct two sets of politicians, one consisting of politicians who have made "centripetal" leaps, the other of politicians who have made "centrifugal" leaps. The centripetal set contains current (2014–19) MEPs who did not serve in the EP in the 2009–14 term but served as MNPs immediately before their election to the EP. To construct this set, we examined the biographies and declarations of all MEPs newly elected in the May 2014 elections (from www.europarl.europa.eu). For MEPs whose immediate preelection positions remained unclear following this process, we cross-checked the relevant NPs' websites to determine whether the individual had served as an MNP immediately before she began her post-2014 EP stint. We included all MEPs whose current Twitter accounts had been active at all moments we intended to compare. Thus, to be included in the centripetal set, an individual needed (i) to have been a nonmember of the EP at the conclusion of the EP's 2009–14 session; (ii) to have been elected to the EP in 2014 and be serving in the EP throughout the sampled EP span (September 1, 2014 through November 30, 2014); (iii) to have served in a national legislature immediately before her 2014 election to the EP; and (iv) to have been using the handle listed on the EP's Twitter directory during the two sampled three-month periods (MNP period = September 1, 2013 through November 30, 2013, MEP period = September 1, 2014 through November 30, 2014). The centripetal set contains 29 legislators.

The centrifugal set contains legislators who served the EP during the 2009–14 term and have subsequently become MNPs. To construct the centrifugal set, we assembled a list of MEPs who served to the end of the 2009–14 legislative session (June 30, 2014) but did not return to the EP after the elections. We then searched the bio pages of the relevant national legislature to determine whether the individual was serving as an MNP during a 2015 tweet sample period (September 1, 2015 through November 31, 2015). Again, we assured that each individual used the same Twitter handle during her MEP and MNP stints. To be included in the centrifugal set, an individual needed (i) to have served as an MEP during the 2013 tweet sample period (September 1, 2013 through November 30, 2013); (ii) to have served in the EP until the conclusion of the 2009–14 session; (iii) to have assumed a seat in a NP after leaving the EP; (iv) to have occupied her NP seat during the 2015 tweet sample period (September 1, 2015 through November 30, 2015);[2] and (v) to have been using the same handle during both three-month periods. The centrifugal set includes 14 legislators.[3]

To assemble the tweet database, we used the Twitter website's Advanced Search function. We collected tweets manually through the site's interface because of limitations to Twitter's public Application Programming Interface (API).[4] For each legislator, we queried each month and recorded results for total tweets, retweets, and @-replies. Overall, this process yielded 22,723 tweets. Once the tweets were collected, the Language Detection API was used to score each tweet's language. Because informal tweet diction is common, we manually checked the API results to ensure validity.

Below, after discussing descriptive statistics, we present statistical models. We have four dependent variables—number of tweets, number of @-replies, number of retweets, and number of tweets published in a language other than the legislator's dominant language. Because each dependent variable relies on a count, we employ negative binomial regression models.

We present bivariate and multivariate models. The multivariate model attempts to control for factors that studies of MEPs on Twitter find significant (Larsson, 2015; Obholzer & Daniel, 2016; Scherpereel et al., 2017). These studies tend to agree that age (younger politicians use Twitter more), partisan extremity (politicians at ideological extremes use Twitter more), and left status (politicians of the left use Twitter more) affect legislators' usage. The same studies suggest that a number of constituency characteristics—including the mean age of a constituency and constituencies' technological levels, social media penetration rates, and levels of political Internet usage—affect how politicians use Twitter. In national legislative contexts, data for constituency characteristics are not always available. Most legislators in our data set represent NP districts that are geographically smaller than their respective EP districts. While there are demographic differences among districts within states, these differences are often less marked than such differences across states. Thus, while recognizing that the design control is not as strong for constituency characteristics as it is for personal characteristics, we assume that by leaving constituency characteristics out of the models we are not omitting causally consequential information.

The data set on which the multivariate models rests contains two rows for each legislator—one for the legislator's EP tenure, the other for her NP tenure. In addition to the independent variable of interest, *MEP* (MNP = 0, MEP = 1), the data set includes a number of institutional controls. The first controls for *Constituents represented*. Here, we follow Obholzer and Daniel (2016), who find that legislators who represent more constituents are more likely to use Twitter prolifically.[5] We also integrate *Preferential vote* and *District magnitude*. Scherpereel et al. (2017) and Obholzer and Daniel (2016) find that preferential voting arrangements affect Twitter behavior. The latter authors find a significant interaction between preferential voting and district magnitude ("[legislators] from preferential voting systems are far more likely to be active on Twitter when they hail from districts of a larger magnitude. The reverse is found to be true of systems in which there is no voting preference allowed: as district magnitude increases, Twitter usage decreases") (Obholzer & Daniel, 2016, p. 403). For *Preferential vote*, we employ a dichotomous measure (0 = no preferential vote, 1 = any kind of preferential vote; single-member districts are coded 1). For *District magnitude* in the EP, we use a 2014 EP report (European Parliament, 2014). For NPs' district magnitudes, we use data from member states' electoral commissions, statistical offices, and parliamentary websites.[6] Because studies also suggest that legislators under electoral threat may use Twitter more, we include *Endangered legislator*. We operationalize this variable by subtracting the share of the vote won by a legislator's party from the share of that party's vote in the previous election to the same chamber. We derive these values (which can be negative) from the same report mentioned above (European Parliament, 2014) and from electoral commissions and parliamentary websites for NP elections.

Results and Analysis

A superficial glance at the figures in Table 1 suggests some differences between MEP and MNP Twitter behavior. For all four dependent variables, MEP medians are higher than MNP medians. The figure for median MEP tweets over the three-month period (132, or approximately 1.5 per day) is higher than the figure for median MNP tweets (45, or 0.5 per day). Few of Europe's multilevel legislators make use of Twitter's dialogical features, but there is a superficial discrepancy for both @-replies (median MEP = 7, median MNP = 2) and retweets (median MEP = 19, median MNP = 7), and the descriptive analysis of tweet languages is generally consistent with H1. The median MEP publishes 1.46 percent of her tweets in a language other than her home country/region's dominant language, while the median MNP publishes zero tweets in a nonnative language. The lack of a larger sample, however, suggests the importance of caution in interpreting these statistics. In Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the paired arrays for the four count variables, "Total tweets" ($p = 0.070$) and "Number of tweets in a nondominant language" ($p = 0.012$) approach conventional significance levels, but @-replies ($p = 0.453$) and retweets ($p = 0.095$) fall short of conventional significance levels.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Type of Legislator	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Total tweets			
MEPs	132	0	1982
MNPs	45	0	2093
@-Replies			
MEPs	7	0	590
MNPs	2	0	608
Retweets			
MEPs	19	0	998
MNPs	7	0	1485
# Of tweets in nondominant language			
MEPs	3	0	215
MNPs	0	0	461
% Of tweets in nondominant language			
MEPs	1.46	0	100
MNPs	0	0	100

Our regression results, which we present in Tables 2 and 3, also generally fail to reveal significant associations. In these models, we exclude legislators who gained their NP seats via a mechanism other than direct elections. Again, the low number of significant findings may reflect the small number of observations. In the bivariate model, the independent variable of interest shows no significant relationship with any of the four dependent variables. In the multivariate models, the sign of the independent variable of interest (*MEP*) is positive in all four models but fails to reach significance in any model. The models' institutional controls also generally fail to reach conventional significance levels. The *Set* variable, which specifies whether a legislator served in a NP before (0) or after (1) serving in the EP, is insignificant in all models except model (4), which examines determinants of tweets in a legislator's nondominant language. Overall, these results fail to support either H1 or H2.

While our statistical analyses throw limited light on the factors that affect a legislator's approach to Twitter, insights can be gained through further descriptive

Table 2. MEP Status and Twitter Behavior

	Dependent Variable			
	Tweets (1)	@-Replies (2)	Retweets (3)	Non-Dominant-Language Tweets (4)
MEP	−0.035	−0.505	0.005	0.056
	(0.401)	(0.531)	(0.523)	(0.546)
Constant	5.513***	4.162***	4.529***	2.712***
	(0.298)	(0.394)	(0.388)	(0.405)
Observations	78	78	78	78
Log likelihood	−465.953	−300.331	−345.713	−222.080
Θ	0.322***(0.05)	0.184***(0.03)	0.190***(0.03)	0.176***(0.03)
Akaike inf. crit.	935.906	604.661	695.426	448.161

Note: $^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table 3. Determinants of Legislators' Twitter Behavior

	Dependent Variable			
	Tweets (1)	@-Replies (2)	Retweets (3)	Non-Dominant-Language Tweets (4)
MEP	0.381	1.141	0.593	1.055
	(0.783)	(1.037)	(1.010)	(0.997)
Constituents represented	−0.009	−0.033***	−0.011	0.002
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Preferential vote	−0.146	−0.386	−0.050	0.540
	(0.558)	(0.739)	(0.720)	(0.724)
District magnitude	−0.014	−0.011	−0.020	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Preferential vote × District magnitude	0.037	0.037	0.046	−0.052
	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Endangered legislator	−0.009*	−0.007	−0.010	−0.048
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.030)
Set	0.320	0.158	0.749	2.381***
	(0.448)	(0.593)	(0.577)	(0.544)
Constant	5.903***	4.971***	4.691***	0.202
	(0.688)	(0.911)	(0.887)	(0.903)
Observations	78	78	78	78
Log likelihood	−462.354	−297.528	−341.845	−211.115
Θ	0.345***(0.05)	−0.198***(0.03)	0.208***(0.03)	0.246***(0.05)
Akaike inf. crit.	940.708	611.056	699.690	438.231

Note: $^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

analysis. Consider, for example, that of the 43 legislators that satisfied our selection criteria, nearly a quarter (10/43, 23.3 percent) had dormant or effectively dormant accounts. Their *total* tweet sums (e.g., MEP-era tweets + MNP-era tweets) were, respectively, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 3, 5, 8, 12, and 13. Among the remaining legislators who were elected to their positions, two groups stood out—those who used Twitter more as MEPs, and those who used Twitter more as MNPs.

Table 4 summarizes descriptive data on these groups. After eliminating (i) nonelected MNPs and (ii) dormant and near-dormant accounts, we calculated a sum value for all remaining legislators. The sum conveys whether a legislator tweeted more, more dialogically, and more multilingually as an MEP than s/he did/does as an MNP (or vice-versa). To calculate the sum, we began by placing legislators in quartiles for each dependent variable measure and summing the four quartile ranks (minimum sum = 4, maximum sum = 16). Legislators with higher sums used Twitter more as MEPs; those with lower sums used Twitter more as MNPs.

Table 4. Change in Individual Legislators' Behaviors Between MNP and MEP Stints (Quartile Scores and Sum of Quartile Scores)

Member State	Set	Total Tweets	@-Replies	Retweets	% Tweets in Nondominant Language	Sum
Kaja KALLAS (EE)	0	4	4	4	4	16
Alessia Maria MOSCA (IT)	0	4	4	4	4	16
Helga STEVENS (BE)	0	4	4	4	4	16
Maria ARENA (BE)	0	4	4	4	3	15
Morten LØKKEGAARD (DK)	1	4	4	4	3	15
Brian HAYES (IE)	0	4	3	4	2	13
Patricija ŠULIN (SL)	0	3	4	3	3	13
Simona BONAFÈ (IT)	0	3	2	3	4	12
Cora van NIEUWENHUIZEN (NL)	0	3	2	3	4	12
Dariusz ROSATI (PL)	0	4	3	1	4	12
Jadwiga WIŚNIEWSKA (PL)	0	3	4	3	2	12
Barbara KUDRYCKA (PL)	0	2	1	4	4	11
Salvatore CICU (IT)	0	3	2	3	2	10
Luke Ming FLANAGAN (IE)	0	2	3	2	2	9
Alessandra MUSSOLINI (IT)	0	2	2	3	2	9
Kārlis ŠADURSKIS (LV)	1	3	3	1	2	9
Richard SULÍK (SK)	0	3	3	1	2	9
Pina PICIERNO (IT)	0	1	1	3	3	8
Carl SCHLYTER (SE)	1	1	2	2	3	8
Zbigniew KUŻMIUK (PL)	0	2	1	2	2	7
Isabella DE MONTE (IT)	0	1	1	2	3	7
Soledad CABEZÓN RUIZ (ES)	0	2	1	2	2	7
Sari ESSAYAH (FI)	1	2	2	1	1	6
Satu HASSI (FI)	1	1	3	1	1	6
Paul MURPHY (IE)	1	1	1	1	3	6
Adam SZEJNFELD (PL)	0	1	1	2	2	6
Åsa WESTLUND (SE)	1	1	3	1	1	6

Note: For "Set" 0 = centripetal, 1 = centrifugal.

Information about a single legislator may help to clarify this process. Consider Estonian legislator Kaja Kallas, who was part of the centripetal set. During the sampled period of her service in the Estonian Parliament, Kallas tweeted 30 times. During her MEP period, she tweeted 132 times; thus, she tweeted 340 percent more as an MEP than she did as an MNP. We calculated the median percent change between MNP periods and MEP periods for included legislators (+59.3 percent) then divided legislators into quartiles. Because Kallas was in the highest quartile of MEPs, we assigned her a total tweets score of four. We calculated her quartile placements for the other dimensions and added the four quartile scores. We record sums in Table 4's final column.[7]

There is some clustering at the top and bottom of Table 4. The legislators at the top of the table (those with a sum score of $\geq$15) emerged at or near the top on all four dependent variables. They tweeted more, engaged more, and tweeted more multilingually as MEPs than they did as MNPs. The legislators at the bottom of the table (those with a score of $\leq$7) tended to tweet more, engage more, and tweet more multilingually as MNPs than they did as MEPs. As a first step toward explaining the clustering at the top and bottom of the table, we assembled

"institutional biographies" of all listed legislators across their periods as MEPs and MNPs. We focused on the nature of their responsibilities (e.g., leadership positions, committee and joint parliamentary delegation assignments, rapporteurships).

The inclusion of two former Belgian senators (Maria Arena and Helga Stevens) at the top of the table may seem unsurprising. Both legislators had been elected to Belgium's Senate in 2010. That election produced a stalemate, and it took party leaders 541 days to reach a coalition agreement. As part of that agreement, leaders agreed to abolish directly elected Senate seats in May 2014. One might surmise that Arena, Stevens, and other legislators who face little direct electoral check would have little incentive to use Twitter and that their increased activity while in an elected position would be of little surprise.

There are at least three reasons to view this idea with suspicion. First, Twitter remains an elite-focused platform (Larsson, 2015); the irrelevance of voters does not imply the absence of online audiences. Second, the closure of one institutional door (e.g., the Senate) may open alternative institutional windows (e.g., the EP). The fact that voters dropped out of the senatorial calculation did not imply their irrelevance to Arena or Stevens. Insofar as these legislators foresaw a future run in EP elections, they may well have been expected to tweet *more* during their lame duck periods. Third, our data suggest that the irrelevance of voters does not necessarily imply Twitter "radio silence." Three British legislators who left the EP in 2014 have become active life peers in the House of Lords. One (Baron Callanan) had a dormant account during both sample periods. The other two (Baroness Ludford, Baron Cashman) have been more active as Lords than they were as MEPs. While deeper comparative analysis of upper and lower chambers is beyond the present study's scope, incumbents of allegedly obsolete institutions may use Twitter to broadcast their value and relevance.

Comparison of the biographies of Arena, Stevens, and the other legislators at the top of Table 4 with the biographies of the other legislators suggests that politicians who are active during their EP tenures may be adjusting their behaviors because of the distinctive positions they hold within the chamber. Consider the cases of Kaja Kallas (EE), Alessia Mosca (IT), and Morten Løkkegaard (DE). During their EP stints, all three legislators have been responsible for important technology-related policy rapporteurships. Kallas is the parliament's rapporteur on the digital single market, and Mosca was rapporteur for the strategy on third-country intellectual property right enforcement. Neither Kallas nor Mosca focused, during her respective MNP period, on technology. Kallas chaired the Riigikogu's committee on economic affairs; Mosca was on the EU affairs committee of the Chamber of Deputies. Løkkegaard has leaped numerous times between national and European legislative duties. During his 2009–14 EP stint, he served as rapporteur for the EP's report on journalism and new media and tweeted relatively frequently. Failing to achieve reelection to the EP in 2014, he successfully campaigned for the Danish Folketinget in 2015. Upon taking his seat, he served on the European Affairs committee and tweeted infrequently. More recently, Løkkegaard has moved back to the EP: when Lars Løkke Rasmussen tapped his party colleague, MEP Ulla Tørnæs, to be a minister, he

called on Løkkegaard to fill Tørnæs's seat. As a result, Løkkegaard returned to the EP in March 2016.[8]

The two Belgian ex-senators have similar profiles. Like Kallas, Mosca, and Løkkegaard, Arena and Stevens have unbalanced institutional biographies. For the Belgian legislators, though, the imbalance has less to do with policy niche (e.g., tech- vs. non-tech-centered) and more to do with leadership and workload. During her time as a Belgian senator, Marie Arena played relatively understated roles: she served on one committee (European Affairs) and represented Belgium in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe. In the EP, Arena has been significantly more active. Since 2014, she has served on two committees (International Trade; Women's Rights and Gender Equality) and two delegations (ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly; Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean), and she has drafted five different rapporteur reports. The contrast between Stevens's Senate and EP tenures has been even more dramatic. After serving briefly as vice-president of the Senate in 2010–11, she retreated to the periphery of Senate life. In the EP, though, she has been a consistently central player. She was elected vice-president of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in 2014, and the ECR selected her as its candidate for the EP presidency in 2016.

Details on the legislators who cluster at the bottom of Table 4—and comparison of their institutional biographies with those of others in the table—reinforce these notions and point in additional potentially productive directions. In three of the four multivariate models presented above, *Set* (centripetal vs. centrifugal) lacked a significant association with the dependent variable. For the one significant association detected (non-dominant-language tweets), few plausible theoretical explanations recommend themselves. While *Set* pulls little explanatory weight in the separate models, however, the clustering of centrifugal set legislators at the bottom of Table 4 is nonetheless striking. This cluster is small (five legislators) and restricted (it excludes Løkkegaard and another centrifugal set legislator). On the surface, the cluster might suggest that a legislator's experience as one among many (e.g., one MEP from over 700) could somehow encourage her to distinguish herself, via tweeting, in other political arenas.

The most distinctive characteristic of the institutional biographies of legislators at the bottom of Table 4, however, is that they mirror the biographies of those at the top of the table: policy dossiers, the cases again suggest, may have a larger effect on Twitter behavior than institutional setting. Here, the cases of Soledad Cabezón Ruiz (ES) and Isabella De Monte (IT) are instructive. The institutional responsibilities of legislators at the top of Table 4 tend to be weighted toward the EP side; the opposite is true of Cabezón Ruiz and De Monte. Since her election to the EP in 2014, Cabezón Ruiz has had a standard freshman workload. She serves on two committees (Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety; Petitions) and one joint parliamentary committee (EU-Chile). She has served as rapporteur for a single, non-tech-related file. Her policy responsibilities were significantly heavier when she was a member of the Cortes, where she served on four high-profile committees and commissions. De Monte's biography is similar:

as an MEP, she holds no leadership positions, serves on one committee (Transport and Tourism) and one joint parliamentary committee (EU-Macedonia), and has served as rapporteur for one report. In the Camera dei Deputati, she was a much more central figure—serving as secretary of one standing committee, member of another, and member of two select committees.

The case of Finland's Satu Hassi is also instructive. Hassi has tweeted frequently as both MEP (total sampled tweets = 1,015) and MNP (total sampled tweets = 2,093). Unlike Cabezón Ruiz and De Monte, though, Hassi's EP and national dossiers are of similar nature and weight. In the EP, Hassi was a member of the Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety committee and the parliamentary delegations on India and Mexico. In the Eduskunta, she serves on the environment committee and the forum for international affairs. The largest difference between Hassi's policy dossiers is that while she was a rank-and-file committee member in the EP, she chairs her Eduskunta committee. This difference, in combination with the fact that Hassi previously served as Finland's environment minister, may help to explain her deeper engagement with Twitter as an MNP. Hassi's case may also suggest a distinctive causal mechanism underlying Table 4's centrifugal set clustering. Perhaps centrifugal set MNPs cluster at the bottom, less because they have learned from the experience of being "one among many" and more because national party leaders perceive their EP experience as a factor that qualifies them for leadership. The leadership positions, in turn, may encourage them to use Twitter more, more dialogically, and/or more multilingually.

In sum, while neither H1 nor H2 receives support from statistical models, analysis of institutional biographies suggests that leadership positions, committee responsibilities, and policy niches may do more to condition Twitter behaviors than the chambers that legislators serve. This idea, which requires deeper scrutiny in future work, also has implications for (i) the content of tweets (one might expect the tweets of legislators specializing in matters related to technology policy to focus disproportionately on tech-related content) and (ii) the characteristics of legislators' networks (e.g., one might expect these legislators to have networks populated by actors focused on technological issues).

Conclusions

There are theoretical reasons to expect MEPs and MNPs to approach Twitter differently. Certain strands of theory—encapsulated here in H1—suggest that MEPs might be more active tweeters. Other strands—encapsulated in H2—suggest that the platform should be particularly alluring to MNPs. We have attempted to leverage the EU's multilevel nature to test these rival hypotheses.

Statistical tests do not clearly support H1 or H2. In most cases, we cannot reject the notion that there is no difference between the Twitter behavior of MEPs and MNPs. Future research is necessary to determine whether this null finding is a function of the relatively small number of observations or whether the lack of differences are robust to a larger N. Because of its inherently multilevel nature,

the EU is an attractive context in which to conduct such research, but there is no theoretical reason to limit such scrutiny to the national–supranational milieu. Effectively all national polities, after all, feature multilevel career opportunities, albeit to extents that vary across space and time. As Twitter matures and becomes a more or less standard component of legislators' communication strategies, opportunities for empirical scrutiny will multiply.

Our qualitative probe has suggested, preliminarily, that the policy nature and leadership levels of legislators' responsibilities in particular chambers may do more to affect their approaches to Twitter than their broader institutional setting. One consistent finding from the broader literature is that politicians who use Twitter prefer broadcasting to dialogical engagement. Most legislators see Twitter as a way to get the word out, to show themselves at work, and to convince audiences—particularly elite audiences—that they are doing important work. Our qualitative analysis suggests that politicians focused on technological, innovation-heavy, and communications-related dossiers, with heavier workloads and/or stronger leadership roles may be particularly attracted to Twitter, regardless of the institution in which they sit. If this finding is robust to further investigation, it would support a conception of legislators as less concerned with using social media to push forward their institution's position and more concerned with using social media as a tool of career promotion.

John A. Scherpereel, **Ph.D.**, Professor, Department of Political Science, James Madison University—Political Science, Harrisonburg, Virginia [scherpja@jmu.edu].
Jerry Wohlgemuth, **M.A.**, StellaService, New York, New York.
Audrey Lievens, **M.A.**, James Madison University—Political Science, Firenze, Italy.

Notes

1. Fish and Kroenig (2009) do not calculate PPIs for Luxembourg and Malta.
2. For two legislators in the centrifugal set, we used different MNP period dates. Georgios Koumoutsakos (EL) assumed his seat in the Hellenic Parliament on October 3, 2015; for his MNP period, we used October 3, 2015 through January 1, 2016. Åsa Westlund (SE) took leave from the Riksdag on October 31, 2015; for Westlund, we used September 29, 2014 through December 28, 2014.
3. There has been no exhaustive study of the effect of electoral calendars on legislators' social media use. Preliminary considerations (e.g., Bruns & Highfield, 2013; Obholzer & Daniel, 2016) suggest that legislators use Twitter more during electoral campaigns than periods of ordinary business. Our selection of temporal samples aims to minimize campaign-induced acceleration effects. For 10 legislators in the centripetal set, no national election date had been set as of the final day of the sampled period. For the 19 remaining legislators in that set, the average number of days until the upcoming general election was 611; the minimum number of days to election among those 19 was 176. For the MEP period of centripetal set legislators, the number of days from the final date of the sampled EP period and the next EP election is over 1,600 (the exact 2019 EP election dates have not been set). For the centrifugal legislators' sampled EP period, 173 days separated the conclusion of the sample period and the first day of the May 2014 EP elections. This difference falls well outside of the two-month preelection benchmark that Obholzer and Daniel (2016) employ. For centrifugal set legislators' MNP period, no general election date had been set as of the final date of

the sampled period for 12 of 14 legislators. The remaining two legislators had "days until election" values of 88 and 20.

4. Twitter's public API permits consumers to retrieve 3,200 results from a given user's timeline. For legislators who use Twitter prolifically, 3,200 tweets spans only the immediate past. We checked the validity of results obtained from Advanced Search by querying user tweets back to Twitter's launch in 2006. We compared results achieved through Advanced Search to the number of tweets reported on users' profile pages. We were able to reconcile these two numbers for most queried legislators. Remaining gaps are likely to reflect two realities: (i) Twitter allows users to remove tweets from their timelines; and (ii) Advanced Search limits access to certain retweets.
5. For the EP, our operationalization differs slightly from Obholzer and Daniel (2016), who use the total number of citizens (in tens of thousands) represented per MEP, averaged by nationality. Rather than averaging by nationality, we utilize actual populations of EP electoral districts. This difference matters for MEPs elected in the five countries that divide their territories into multiple districts. We express the total number of citizens in tens of thousands.
6. We use the district magnitude of the district that the legislator represents rather than nationally aggregated average district magnitudes.
7. For the count variables (total tweets, @-replies, retweets), in cases where the denominator was zero, we adjusted the value to 1 to calculate a value for percent change. For percentage of tweets in a non-dominant language, we calculated quartiles using the difference between the percentage of non-dominant-language tweets while MEP and the percentage of non-dominant-language tweets while MNP.
8. Since his March 2016 return to the EP, Løkkegaard has become vice-chair of the employment and social affairs committee and has been relatively active on Twitter. While it is true that the employment dossier has less to do with technology than dossiers like the digital single market, many of Løkkegaard's post-3/2016 tweets have referenced the June 23, 2016 Brexit referendum. The field awaits more thorough analysis of the Twittersphere in the leadup to and aftermath of the Brexit vote. Preliminary analysis suggests that the Brexit vote may have catalyzed a Twitter acceleration resembling more familiar campaign acceleration dynamics.

References

Anderson, P.J., and A. McLeod. 2014. "The Great Non-Communicator? The Mass Communication Deficit of the European Parliament and Its Press Directorate." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42 (5): 897–917.

Arter, D. 2015. "Why Do MPs Want to Be MEPs? Candidate Incentives and Party Nomination Strategies in European Parliament Elections in Finland." *European Politics and Society* 16 (4): 540–55.

Ausserhoffer, J., and A. Maireider. 2013. "National Politics on Twitter: Structures and Topics of a Networked Public Sphere." *Information, Communication and Society* 16 (3): 291–314.

Bernhard, U., and M. Dohle. 2015. "Local Politics Online: The Influence of Presumed Influence on Local Politicians' Online Communication Activities in Germany". *Local Government Studies* 41 (5): 755–73.

Borchert, J., and K. Stolz. 2011. "Introduction: Political Careers in Multi-Level Systems." *Regional and Federal Studies* 21 (2): 107–15.

Broersma, M., and T. Graham. 2012. "Social Media as Neat: Tweets as a News Source During the 2010 British and Dutch Elections." *Journalism Practice* 6 (3): 403–19.

Bruns, A., and T. Highfield. 2013. "Political Networks on Twitter: Tweeting the Queensland State Election." *Information, Communication & Society* 16 (5): 667–91.

Burkimsher, M. 2014. "Is Religious Attendance Bottoming Out? An Examination of Current Trends Across Europe." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 53 (2): 432–45.

Coman, J., and Helm, T. 2014. "Voters Can't Name Their MEPs as Poll Highlights Disengagement With EU." *The Guardian* (May 10). http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/may/10/voters-cant-name-their-mep

Cook, J.M. 2016. "Are American Politicians as Partisan Online as They Are Offline? Twitter Networks in the U.S. Senate and Maine State Legislature." *Policy & Internet* 8 (1): 55–71.

Daniel, W.T. 2015. *Career Behavior and the European Parliament: All Roads Lead Through Brussels*? Oxford: Oxford UP.

Ebbinghaus, B. 2002. "Trade Unions' Changing Role: Membership Erosion, Organisational Reform, and Social Partnership in Europe." *Industrial Relations Journal* 33 (5): 465–83.

Enli, G. 2017. "Twitter as Arena for the Authentic Outsider: Exploring the Social Media Campaigns of Trump and Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential Election." *European Journal of Communication* 32 (1): 50–61.

European Commission. 2013. *Eurobarometer 79.5: European Parliament, European Identity, Globalization*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission. 2014. *Eurobarometer 81: Public Opinion in the European Union*. Brussels: European Commission.

European Parliament. 2014. *Les Élections Européennes et Nationales en Chiffres*. Brussels: European Parliament Directorate-General for Communication.

Fenno, R. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. New York: Longman.

Fish, M.S., and M. Kroenig. 2009. *The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gibson, R., and S. Ward. 2009. "Parties in the Digital Age—A Review Article." *Representation* 45 (1): 88–100.

Golbeck, J., J.M. Grimes, and A. Rogers. 2010. "Twitter Use by the U.S. Congress." *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology* 61 (8): 1612–21.

Grant, W.J., B. Moon, and J.B. Grant. 2010. "Digital Dialogue? Australian Politicians' Use of the Social Network Tool Twitter." *Australian Journal of Political Science* 45 (4): 579–604.

Highfield, T. 2013. "National and State-Level Politics on Social Media: Twitter, Australian Political Discussions, and the Online Commentariat." *International Journal of Electronic Governance* 6 (4): 342–60.

Hix, S., and B. Høyland. 2013. "Empowerment of the European Parliament." *Annual Review of Political Science* 16: 171–89.

Hix, S., and M. Marsh. 2007. "Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 69 (2): 495–510.

Hix, S., A. Noury, and G. Roland. 2005. "Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001." *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (2): 209–34.

Hobolt, S.B. 2007. "Taking Cues on Europe? Voter Competence and Party Endorsements in Referendums on European Integration." *European Journal of Political Research* 46 (2): 151–82.

Hoffmann, C., A. Suphan, and M. Meckel. 2016. "The Impact of Use Motives on Politicians' Social Media Adoption." *Journal of Information Technology and Politics Forthcoming* 13 (3): 239–56.

Jackson, N., and D. Lilleker. 2011. "Microblogging, Constituency Service and Impression Management: UK MPs and the Use of Twitter." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 17 (1): 86–105.

Larsson, A.O. 2015. "The EU Parliament on Twitter: Assessing the Permanent Online Practices of Parliamentarians." *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* 12 (2): 149–66.

Larsson, A.O., and B. Kalsnes. 2014. "'Of Course We Are on Facebook': Use and Non-Use of Social Media Among Swedish and Norwegian Politicians." *European Journal of Communication* 29 (6): 663–67.

Larsson, A.O., and H. Moe. 2013. "Twitter in Politics and Elections: Insights From Scandinavia." In *Twitter and Society*, eds. K. Weller, A. Bruns, J. Burgess, M. Mahrt, and C. Puschmann. New York: Peter Lang, 319–30.

Larsson, A.O., and J. Svensson. 2014. "Politicians Online: Identifying Current Research Opportunities." *First Monday* 19:4. https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v19i4.4897

Lassen, D.S., and A.R. Brown. 2011. "Twitter: The Electoral Connection?" *Social Science Computer Review* 29 (4): 419–36.

Lilliker, D.G., and K. Koc-Michalska. 2013. "Online Political Communication Strategies: MEPs, E-Representation, and Self-Representation." *Journal of Information Technology and Politics* 10 (2): 190–207.

Machill, M., M. Beiler, and C. Fischer. 2006. "Europe-Topics in Europe's Media: The Debate About the European Public Sphere: A Meta-Analysis of Media Content Analyses." *European Journal of Communication* 21 (1): 57–88. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0267323106060989

Mayhew, D. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Obholzer, L., and W.T. Daniel. 2016. "An Online Electoral Connection? How Electoral Systems Condition Representatives' Social Media Use." *European Union Politics* 17 (3): 387–407.

Peterson, R.D. 2012. "To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Exploring the Determinants of Early Adoption of Twitter by House Members in the 111th Congress." *The Social Science Journal* 49 (4): 430–8.

Rauchfleisch, A., and J. Metag. 2016. "The Special Case of Switzerland: Swiss Politics on Twitter." *New Media and Society* 18 (10): 2413–31.

Riarh, K., and J. Roy. 2014. "The Impacts of Social Media on Government and Democracy: An Examination of Municipal Usage in Nova Scotia, Canada." In *Open Government*, ed. M. Gascó-Hernández. New York: Springer, 85–99.

Rittberger, B. 2005. *Building Europe's Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond the Nation State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scarrow, S.E. 1997. "Political Career Paths and the European Parliament." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22 (2): 253–63.

Scherpereel, J.A., J. Wohlgemuth, and M. Schmelzinger. 2017. "The Adoption and Use of Twitter as a Representational Tool Among Members of the European Parliament." *European Politics and Society* 18 (2): 111–27.

Schmitt, H. 2005. "The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second Order?" *West European Politics* 28 (3): 650–79.

Sieberer, U. 2006. "Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies: A Comparative Analysis." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 12 (2): 150–78.

Stolz, K. 2003. "Moving Up, Moving Down: Political Careers Across Territorial Levels." *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (2): 223–48.

Van Biezen, I., and T. Poguntke. 2014. "The Decline of Membership-Based Politics." *Party Politics* 20 (2): 205–16.

Vergeer, M., L. Hermans, and S. Sams. 2013. "Online Social Networks and Micro-Blogging in Political Campaigning: The Exploration of a New Campaign Tool and a New Campaign Style." *Party Politics* 19 (3): 477–501.

Voas, D. 2009. "The Rise and Fall of Fuzzy Fidelity in Europe." *European Sociological Review* 25 (2): 155–68.

Whitaker, R. 2014. "Tenure, Turnover and Careers in the European Parliament: MEPs as Policy-Seekers." *Journal of European Public Policy* 21 (10): 1509–27.